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Hodges: Taxation

TAXATION
I.

A.

FEDERAL INCOME TAX

Deductions

In Carey v. Commissioner' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam the holding of the United States Tax
Court2 that expenses incurred by the taxpayer in his campaign for
reelection as president of the International Union of Electrical,
Radio, and Machine Workers were not deductible in computing
federal income tax liability, either as trade or business expenses
or as expenses paid or incurred for the production of income.' In
Graham v. Commissioner' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
allowed the deduction of proxy expenses designed in part to elect
the taxpayer to a corporate board of directors under section 212
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. However, in Mays v.
Bowers' the same court had refused to permit a similar deduction
to a city councilman for expenses incurred in his political campaign.
A majority of the Tax Court in James B. Carey' felt that the
taxpayer's situation fitted "precisely in the mold" of McDonald
v. Commissioner,7 the leading case in the area. In McDonald the
United States Supreme Court refused to allow a candidate for a
state judgeship to deduct his campaign expenses on grounds of
public policy.
On appeal the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals contented
itself with affirming the Tax Court and discussed neither
McDonald and its Fourth Circuit progeny, nor the issues raised
in the opinion of a minority of the lower court. 8 By this decision
the court of appeals apparently limited Graham to its facts and
1. 460 F.2d 1259 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 325 (1972).
2. James B. Carey, 56 T.C. 477 (1971) (7-5 decision).
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) states: "In General - There shall be allowed as
a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business ....
"
Section 212 of the Code specifies: "In the case of an individual, there should be
allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during
the taxable year-(l) for the production or collection of income .
4. 326 F.2d 878 (4th Cir. 1964).
5. 201 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1953).
6. 56 T.C. 477 (1971).
7. 323 U.S. 57 (1944).
8. 460 F.2d at 1259.
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joined four other circuits in holding campaign expenses generally
non-deductible. 9
B.

Exclusions

0 the Court of Appeals for the
In Hembree v. United States"
Fourth Circuit held that payments received by an intern from the
Medical College of South Carolina Hospital" were not excludible
from gross income as a fellowship within the meaning of section
117 of the Internal Revenue Code. 2
The district court had concluded that these payments were
excludible because they were made for the primary purpose of
furthering the taxpayer's education and training and did not rep9. Maness v. United States, 367 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1966); Shoyer v. United States,
290 F.2d 817 (3d Cir. 1961); Vernon v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1961) (involved a union official); Long v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1960).
10. 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972).
11. This is now called the Medical University of South Carolina Hospital.
12. The relevant portions of the INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 117, and the corresponding
Treasury Regulations are:
§ 117. Scholarships and Fellowship Grants.
(a) General Rule.-In the case of an individual, gross income does not include(1) Any amount received(b) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed services ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (1956). Items not considered as scholarship or fellowship
grants.
The following payments or allowances shall not be considered
to be amounts received as a scholarship or fellowship grant for the
purpose of section 117:
(c) amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the
benefit of the grantor.
(1) . . . .[Any amount paid . . . to . . . an individual to enable
him to pursue studies or research, if such amount represents . . . compensation for past, present, or future employment services ....
(2) any amount paid . . . to . . .an individual to enable him to
pursue studies or research primarily for the benefit of the grantor.
However, amounts paid. . . to. .. an individual. . . are considered to
be amounts received as a . . .fellowship grantfor the purpose of section
117 if the primary purpose of the studies or research is to further the
education and trainingof the recipient in his individualcapacity and the
amount provided by the grantorfor such purpose does not represent
compensation or payment for the services described in subparagraph(1)
of this paragraph.[Emphasis added.]
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resent compensation for services.13 To reach this conclusion the
lower court employed the "primary purpose" test, first applied in
this circuit in Reese v. Commissioner," and found that, because
the primary purpose of the hospital was to train physicians, 5 and
because the amount of payment was considerably lower than the
compensation received by a practicing physician, 6 the payments
were excludible from the taxpayer's income as a fellowship grant
within the meaning of section 117.17
On appeal the circuit court first held that the "primary purpose" test had been misapplied below. Citing Reese for the proposition that "[tihe purpose test requires a determination of the
raisond'etre of the payment," the court said that it is the primary
purpose of the payment, not of the facility making the payment,
which is controlling and that the purpose of the payment was to
compensate the taxpayer for services rendered to the hospital
facility. 8 Second, the circuit court pointed out that the Supreme
Court in Bingler v. Johnson,1 1 although sustaining the validity of
section 1.117-4(c) of the Treasury Regulations, had avoided discussion of the "primary purpose" test and had, in effect, adopted
a different test.20 This test as formulated by the court of appeals
in Hembree is: "[I]f there is any substantial quid pro quo, i.e.,
compensation for services, the payments cannot qualify for exclusion from income as 'fellowship' funds."'"
13. Hembree v. United States, CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (71-2, at 87,518)
9636 (D.S.C. March 3, 1971).
14. 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967), af'g per curiam, 45 T.C. 407 (1966). The "primary
purpose" test is derived from Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (c)(2) (1956), supra note 12.
15. CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (71-2, at 87, 519-20). The district court placed
much emphasis on the language of Act No. 920, [1948] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2430, which
authorized the acquisition of land for a "teaching hospital."
16. CCH 1971 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (71-2, at 87, 520).
17. Id. at 87, 552.
18. 464 F.2d at 1264-65.
19. 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
20. Evidently, the circuit court was considering the language at 394 U.S. 751, 757.
21. 464 F.2d at 1265. This case puts the fourth circuit in agreement with the other
courts which have considered such payments. Rundell v. Commissioner, 455 F.2d 639 (5th
Cir. 1972), af'g 30 CCH TAX CT. REP. 177 (1971); Wertzberger v. United States, 441 F.2d
1166 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'g per curiam, 315 F. Supp. 34 (W.D. Mo. 1970); Quast v. United
States, 428 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1970); Kwass v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 186 (E.D. Mich.
1970); Coggins v. United States, CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (70-2 at 84, 753) 9687
(N.D. Tex. 1970). Cf. Ward v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 766 (8th Cir. 1971); Woodail v.
Commissioner, 321 F.2d 721 (10th Cir. 1963); Shuff v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 807
(W.D.Va. 1971).
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C. Accumulated Earnings
In Industrial Life Insurance Co. v. United States" the taxpayer corporation was held subject to the federal accumulated
earnings tax23 despite its contention that the accumulations were
required to maintain its status as an insurance company under
South Carolina law.24
Since its acquisition by a single family, Industrial Life had
not paid a dividend; its earnings and profits had simply been
allowed to accumulate. The Government contended that Industrial Life was a "corporation . . .availed of for the purpose
of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders [the
family] . . . by permitting earnings and profits to accumulate
instead of being divided and distributed. "2 The taxpayer contended that as a state-chartered insurance company it was only
trying to meet and anticipate increased requirements of capital
and surplus for insurance companies under state law and that
therefore this accumulation was a "reasonable need of the
[insurance] business."
A two-step process must be applied in order to subject a
corporation to the accumulated earnings tax. First, the Government must prove that the accumulation is in excess of "the reasonable needs of the business."2 6 Second, if excess accumulation
is established, the burden shifts to the corporation, which must
prove that the accumulation is not for the purpose of avoiding the
income tax on its shareholders. 7
The Government's strategy was to prove that the taxpayer
was not an insurance company; if it were not, then the accumulation could not be justified as an attempt to meet state requirements for capital and surplus imposed on insurance companies.
Under the Regulations, "The term 'insurance company' means a
company whose primary and predominant business activity dur22. 344 F. Supp. 870 (D.S.C. 1972).
23. Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 531-33.
24. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-181, 37-183 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
25. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 532(a).
26. Id. § 533.
27. Id. § 533(a) provides:
[Tlhe fact that the earnings and profits of a corporation are permitted to
accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business shall be determinative
of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to shareholders, unless the
corporation by a preponderance of the evidence shall prove to the contrary.
[Emphasis added.]
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ing the taxable year is the issuance of insurance . . . contracts
*...*"28 Certainly, if the test of predominant business activity is

simply whether 50% of the taxpayer's income was derived from
premiums, as the court suggests, 9 then the taxpayer is not an
insurance company for section 801 purposes. If this is the case,
and the court so held, the Government has succeeded in showing
that the taxpayer's accumulations are beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. In other words, if it's not an insurance
company, it need not build its reserves.
The taxpayer corporation tried to meet its burden of proving
that the accumulation was not for the purpose of avoiding the
income tax of its respective shareholders by arguing that its
shareholders were in a lower income tax bracket than the corporation; if it were trying to avoid taxes, it would have paid its shareholders. The court rejected this argument, pointing out that dividends are taxed twice-as a part of the corporation's and as a part
of the shareholder's income-leaving over-all tax avoidance intact as a plausible motive for the accumulation."
To the taxpayer's contention that the accumulation was
made in anticipation of stiffer capital and surplus requirements
for insurance companies under state law 3 -not for tax avoidance-the court replied that it might do this more reasonably by
selling more insurance and stock. 2
Finally, the court ruled that land, originally bought by the
taxpayer for investment purposes, was held and sold in the ordinary course of business because the corporation had subdivided
and sold lots quite regularly over a number of years. Thus, the
gain from the sale of this property was taxable at ordinary rates.
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(a) (1972). The court neglected to point out that these
definitions are to be used for determining the taxability of corporations as life insurance
companies. Arguably, such restrictive definitions-used to limit the size of the class eligible for the tax benefits accorded to life insurance companies-should have little weight
in determining what is an insurance company for other purposes. This seems especially
true when the same Regulation states that a corporation's "name, charter powers and
subjection to state insurance laws are significant in determining the business which a
company. . . intends to carry on. . . ." Id.
29. 344 F. Supp. at 877. The court relies heavily on Bowers v. Lawyers' Mortgage Co.,
285 U.S. 182 (1932).
30. United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297 (1969), requires only that tax avoidance be one of the motives behind such accumulations.
31. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-181, 37-183 (Cum. Supp. 1971). In view of the frequency
and direction of change in these laws, taxpayer's expectations do not seem unreasonable.
32. 344 F. Supp. at 874. It is interesting to note that the taxpayer had no insurance
sales force.
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D. Insurance Company Defined
In Superior Life Insurance Co. v. United States,3 the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the decision of the
district court34 and held that Superior was not a life insurance
company for federal income tax purposes. 5 Superior is a whollyowned subsidiary of Stephenson Finance Company engaged in
the business of selling credit life and credit health and accident
insurance, primarily to the debtors of its parent company.
Superior sold this credit insurance to Stephenson's debtors
by means of a group policy under which Stephenson was authorized to sell credit insurance and to issue to each insured debtor a
certificate of insurance from Superior. The face amount of the
loan from Stephenson was increased by an amount sufficient to
pay the full premium for the life, health, and accident coverage.
The debtor received only the amount he originally wanted to
borrow. In reciting the facts, the court stated:
33.
34.
35.
(a)

462 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1972).
Superior Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 921 (D.S.C. 1971).
INT.REv. CODE OF 1954, § 801, provides:
Life Insurance Company Defined.
[Tihe term "life insurance company" means an insurance company which
is engaged in the business of issuing life insurance and annuity contracts (either
separately or combined with health and accident insurance), or noncancellable
contracts of health and accident insurance, if(1) its life insurance reserves (as defined in sub-section (b)), plus
(2) unearned premiums, and unpaid losses (whether or not ascertained), or noncancellable life, health, or accident policies not included
in life insurance reserves, comprise more than 50 percent of its total
reserves (as defined in subsection (c)).
(b) Life Insurance Reserves Defined.
(1) In General
."[L]ife insurance reserves" means amounts(A) which are computed or estimated on the basis of recognized
mortality or morbidity tables and assumed rates of interest, and
(B) which are set aside to mature or liquidate, either by payment
or reinsurance, future unaccrued claims arising from life insurance, annuity, and noncancellable health and accident insurance contracts (including life insurance or annuity contracts combined with noncancellable
health and accident insurance) involving, at the time with respect to
which the reserve is computed, life, health, or accident contingencies.
(c) Total Reserves Defined.
• .[T]he term "total reserves" m6ans(1) life insurance reserves
(2) unearned premiums, and unpaid losses (whether or not ascertained)
not included in life insurance reserves . . . .
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On the first day of the month immediately following the
month in which the certificate of insurance was issued, Stephenson paid to taxpayer (Superior) the full premium for the life
insurance coverage and one month's premium for the accident
and health coverage. Thereafter, on the first day of each month
during the entire remainder of the term, Stephenson paid to the
taxpayer one month's premium for the accident and health
coverage ....
.. . The remainder of the unearned premium paid by the
insured-borrower was shown by Stephenson in a liability account called "Reserve for Unearned A & H Premiums."'"

The primary issue in the case was whether and how this
unearned premium account held by Stephenson should be included in Superior's reserves, for the disposition of this account
determined whether Superior was a life insurance company
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. The circuit
court held the gross amount of this account (1) includible in
Superior's total insurance reserves, and (2) not includible in its
"life insurance" reserves. In the court's view, Superior's life insurance reserves comprised less than the fifty percent of its total
37
reserves required to qualify it as a life insurance company.
The circuit court reasoned that Stephenson, a South Carolina corporation, was the agent of Superior, also a South Carolina
corporation, under state law. 3 Therefore, the account, although
held by Stephenson, had nonetheless been "received" by Superior and should be included in its total reserves. 9 Furthermore,
the account could not be included in Superior's "life insurance
reserves," because only amounts "set aside . . . from . . .
noncancellable health and accident insurance contracts"4
36. 462 F.2d at 948-49.
37. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 801(a). Superior had contended that "the cost of
carrying the insurance risk" (Treas. Reg. § 1.801 - 3(e) (1960)), was only the morbidity
portion of the unearned premiums (the amount necessary to cover the insurance risk) and
did not include the loading portion (the amount designed to cover costs and profits). The
court of appeals held that both portions are "costs" of insuring, hence the gross amount
of the unearned premiums must be included.
38, S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-233 (1962).
39. Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 342 (1920). "[P]ayment of the
premium to the agent discharged the obligation of the insured and called into effect the
obligation of the insurer as fully as payment to the treasurer of the claimant could have
done; ... receipt by an agent is regarded as receipt by his principal." Id. at 347. That
Maryland Casualty could be easily distinguished from SuperiorLife in terms of the respective agents' obligations to turn over funds received did not alter the circuit court's opinion.
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 801(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
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could be so included, and Superior's accident and health contracts did not fall within the definition of "noncancellable" insurance."
To reach the merits in Superior, the circuit court first had
to hold that the Government's appeal was timely. Relying on the
standards set forth in United States v. F. & M. Schaeffer Brewing
Co.,42 the court concluded that an earlier order for judgment was
not "intended by the judge to be his final act" and that the formal
judgment later entered was so intended. Since the government
had filed a notice of appeal within sixty days after the latter
"entry of judgment," it had met the timeliness requirement.43
E. PermissibleLimits of an Internal Revenue Summons
In United States v. Theodore" the vice-president of an accounting firm and the firm itself were ordered to comply with an
Internal Revenue Service summons by producing corporate records relating to tax returns the firm had prepared. Previously
they had objected, asserting that such compliance would violate
their fifth amendment privilege. The district court found that
under South Carolina law the firm was not a partnership but a
corporation by estoppel.45 Under well-settled doctrine a corporation may not avail itself of the fifth amendment privilege, nor
may a corporate officer invoke it, either on the corporation's or
on his own behalf, to bar the production of corporate records."
The respondents also questioned the authority and the necessity of the summons. The court, however, finding adequate
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.801-3(c) (1960).
42. 356 U.S. 227 (1958).
43. FED. R. App. P. 4(a).
44. 347 F. Supp. 1070 (D.S.C. 1972).
45. Dargan v. Graves, 252 S.C. 641, 649-50, 168 S.E.2d 306, 310 (1969); cf. Bethea v.
Allen, 177 S.C. 534, 181 S.E. 893 (1935). See generally 18 C.J.S. Corporations§ 110 (1939).
The accounting service in this case not only held itself out to the public as a corporation,
but filed corporate, not partnership, tax returns.
46. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946); United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
An interesting collateral issue not raised in this case is whether the taxpayers whose
returns were being turned over to the Government would have been able to invoke the
privilege. Some courts have permitted this, at least where criminal prosecution is likely.
Compare Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971) (The Internal Revenue
summons was upheld since it was issued in good faith and prior to criminal prosecution.),
with United States v. Tsukuno, 341 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (taxpayer prevailed
where he had some proprietary interest in the records), and United States v. Kleckner,
273 F. Supp. 251 (S.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 382 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1967).
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authority under sections 7601 and 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code,17 had little patience with their argument that since the
Government already had the taxpayers' returns on file, it did not
need the respondents' copies.48
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS: SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE
TAXING AUTHORITY

In Gunter v. Blanton" the South Carolina Supreme Court
held unconstitutional a statutory provision requiring approval by
the Cherokee County legislative delegation of any tax increase
adopted by the Board of Trustees of Cherokee County School
District No. 1 as a violation of the separation of powers provision
51
of the South Carolina Constitution.
Originally, "[i]n all budgetary matters of the school dis-

trict, the Board of Trustees [had possessed] the sole

authority, and responsibility.

'2

. . .

power,

However, their original power to

"determine and fix the amount of levy needed to operate the
schools"53 was limited by a proviso that: "[N]o such tax levy
shall be increased in any year without the approval of a majority
47. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7601, provides for a "canvass of districts for taxable
persons. . .," pursuant to which the Government had instituted the Tax Preparers Project. 347 F. Supp. at 1073. Respondents had improperly prepared the tax return of an
undercover revenue agent sent to them as part of the project. The summons was to obtain
the names and returns of all those taxpayers whose returns respondents prepared, and IrNT.
RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602, authorizes a summons "[flor the purpose of ascertaining the
correctness of any return. . . ." [Emphasis added.]
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(b), prohibits "unnecessary examination(s) or
investigations(s). . . ." United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964), prohibits an
investigation where the information sought . . . is already within the Commissioner's
possession . . . ." The court seemed to think that the ease with which the respondents
could supply the information, and the supposed difficulty and expense the Government
would have in searching its own files for the names of the taxpayers whose returns the
respondents had prepared outweighed any concerns over the necessity or over-breadth of
the summons. 341 F. Supp. at 1075.
49. 259 S.C. 436, 192 S.E.2d 473 (1972).
50. No. 542, [19691 S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 922, amending No. 685, [19671 S.C. Acts
& Jt. Res. 1408.
51. S.C. CONsT. art. I, § 8. This section provides:
In the government of this state, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers
of the government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other, and
no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall
assume or discharge the duties of any other.
52. No. 685, [1967] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 1409.
53. Id. at 1408.
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of the resident members of the Cherokee County Legislative Delegation." 4
The court reasoned that, although determination of a tax
levy is a legislative power, members of the legislature may exercise such power only as members of the General Assembly. Here
they acted as corporate authorities of the school district-a dual
role in violation of the separation of powers clause of the constitution.
Justice Bussey in his dissenting opinion made a two-pronged
attack on the court's holding. The first may be characterized as
a classic argument for judicial restraint in examining the constitutionality of the acts passed by the General Assembly, lest the
court itself, ironically, be guilty of a violation of the separation
of powers clause.5 The second attack was directed at the court's
logic in saying simultaneously that the determination of the tax
levy is a legislative function delegable to the corporate authorities
of the school district5" and that legislators, acting as such "corporate authorities," violate the separation of powers clause in performing this legislative function. 57
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions disagreed with
the lower court's holding that the function of the legislative delegation under the challenged statute was executive, not legislative
in nature. They simply differed in the conclusions to be drawn
from holding the function to be a legislative one.
54. No. 542, [1969] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 922. This proviso was made subject to a
referendum and approved in an election in April, 1970.
55. 192 S.E.2d at 476-77.
56. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 5, provides: "The corporate authorities of . . . school
districts . . . may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes
57. 259 S.C. at 443-44, 192 S.E.2d at 476.
58. The lower court felt bound to follow Gould v. Barton, 256 S.C. 175, 181 S.E.2d
662 (1971), which declared unconstitutional a provision requiring the legislative delegation's approval of another "corporate authority's" budget. Id. at 201-02, 181 S.E.2d at 674.
In Gould the supreme court felt that such participation in the budgetary process by the
delegation constituted a legislative encroachment on the executive branch prohibited by
the separation of powers clause. It seems logical that if the legislative delegation may not
have the power to approve the budget, it may not have the power to approve or disapprove
an increase in the tax millage rate, since approval of one, in effect, is approval of the other.
Though the majority opinion in Gunter reached the result which logically follows from
Gould, it did so without accepting the theory underlying Gould-that such power is
executive, not legislative in nature-and, in fact, did not even refer to Gould by name. In
slightly over a year, the entire court has changed its mind about the nature of such power.
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INVENTORY VALUATION

In Belk Department Stores v. Taylor59 the taxpayer had divided its inventory for tax purposes into four classifications, two
of which were valued at original cost (new season and basic merchandise) and two of which were valued below original cost (previous season and damaged merchandise). In so doing, the taxpayer followed its traditional accounting method of "cost or market, whichever is lower." 6 The South Carolina Tax Commission
contended that the proper valuation for all classes of taxpayer's
inventory was the original cost of the merchandise.6 1 The Tax
Board of Review agreed with the Tax Commission, but the court
of common pleas held for the taxpayer. On appeal, the supreme
court reversed the lower court's decision on the grounds that there
was sufficient evidence to support the Tax Commission's finding
that the value of the inventory for tax purposes was the original
cost." While ostensibly declining to decide "what formula should
59. 259 S.C. 174, 191 S.E.2d 144 (1972).
60. This method of inventory valuation is acceptable for federal income tax purposes.
"The bases of valuation most commonly used by business concerns and which meet the
requirements of section 471 are (1) cost and (2) cost or market, whichever is lower." Treas.
Reg. § 1.471-2(c) (1958). Arguably, this method was challenged unsuccessfully when used
by the same taxpayer once before. See Wasson v. Mayes, 252 S.C. 497, 167 S.E.2d 304
(1969); 21 S.C.L. REv. 655 (1969). Grimball, J., the trial judge in both cases, felt Wasson
had "[an] authoritative influence on the issues." However, the majority of the South
Carolina Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Lewis, dismissed Wasson without
discussion as "not dispositive of the issues here involved." It is interesting to note that
Justice Bussey, the minority opinion writer in this case, authored the unanimous opinion
in Wasson.
61. Although the Tax Commission has the legal duty of determining the value of
merchants' inventories, S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-1669 (Cum. Supp. 1971), there are constitutional and statutory standards to which it must adhere. Wasson v. Mayes, 252 S.C. 497,
499, 167 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1969).
The test for determining the actual value of the inventory for taxation is "the
actual value of the property taxed," Article I, Section 29, Constitution of
South Carolina, which has been defined in Section 65-1648, 1962 Code Supplement, as "its true value in money which in all cases shall be held to be the price
which the property would bring following reasonable exposure to the market,
where both the seller and the buyer are willing, are not acting under compulsion,
and are reasonably well informed as to the uses and purposes for which it is
adapted and for which it is capable of being used." 259 S.C. at 176, 191 S.E.2d
at 145.
62. If the original cost of an item represents its "true value" for tax purposes when it
is new and/or fashionable-something all parties agreed upon with regard to some of
taxpayer's merchandise-it seems somewhat illogical to hold that the "true value" of an
item which is damaged or out of style is not thereby diminished even though its sales price
has not been reduced below original cost at a certain point in time. However, it should be
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be used in determining value for tax purposes," the supreme
court adopted the Tax Commission's position that the fair market
value of the merchandise for tax purposes is its cost.
The majority derived the requisite evidentiary support for
the Tax Commission's use of the original cost as the actual value
of the inventory from two sources: first, the fact that records in
the five (out of sixty-four) stores audited by the Tax Commission
showed that in many cases damaged and out-of-style merchandise was being offered for sale at prices roughly 35% above the
original cost; second, the fact that the taxpayer's assistant controller testified that it was unwilling to sell the aggregate of the
damaged and out-of-style merchandise at a price equivalent to its
own appraisal.6 3
Justice Bussey entered a vigorous dissenting opinion in
which Justice Brailsford concurred. The dissent pointed out that
the Tax Commissioner had failed to apply its own formula. 4 But
the scope of the dissent was broader than that, for it was directed
at the Tax Commission's formula itself, both conceptually and
practically. Conceptually, the minority felt that the formula did
not adequately allow for obsolescence and depreciation.65 Practically, it placed the merchant on the horns of a dilemma-he must
either re-price his entire inventory at the end of December in
accordance with its actual value, despite seasonal demand, or be
penalized by being taxed upon an excessive valuation.
ANDREW

F. HODGES

emphasized that the court refused to hold the taxpayer's accounting method, "cost or
market, whichever is lower," unacceptable for inventory tax valuation. The court simply
interpreted it as "wholesale cost or retailmarket on a given date,whichever is lower," and
then determined whether the taxpayer had met the heavy burden of proof upon one
contesting an assessment.
63. In the aggregate there was a roughly eight-million dollar difference between the
taxpayer's records and the Tax Commission's valuation.
64. 259 S.C. at 183, 191 S.E.2d at 149. The Tax Commission's own audit of the
taxpayer's records had revealed many instances of retail pricing below original cost, but
they had not made a corresponding reduction in taxpayer's assessment.
65. "[Clost is not synonymous with or representative of actual or true value . . .
proved obsolescence and depreciation must be taken into account." Id. at 182, 191 S.E.2d
at 148 (emphasis deleted); accord, Colorado & Utah Coal Co. v. Rorex, 149 Colo. 502, 369
P.2d 796 (1962); J.I. Case Co. v. Chambers, 210 Ore. 680, 314 P.2d 256 (1957).
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